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For nearly two decades, law firms have been shaken by defections in the
ranks of their members. Lawyers associated in firm practice necessarily cast
wary eyes on their colleagues, wondering who will be the next to leave, when
the exit will occur, and what the damage will be from the loss of clients who
seem more often than not to follow defecting lawyers wherever they may go.
Loyalty to the firm - by its members and by its clients - is a value that, at best,
evokes nostalgic yearnings for some idealized past rather than a standard
under which law is practiced in present times.
It is hardly a secret.that the "grabbing and leaving" activities of law firm
members have served to destabilize the American law firm.' What is surpris-
ing, at least at first glance, is the extent of the activity in light of the "fidu-
ciary" nature of the relationship that exists among partners in a firm. Whether
expressed in terms of a "punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,"2 a duty of
1. On the destabilization of the American law firm, see ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN
ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM
BREAKUPS § 1.1 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter LAWYER MOBILITY].
2. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928); see In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d
226, 235 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (noting that Meinhard statement "still controls" in defining
duties of law partners).
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"undivided loyalty,"3 or an obligation to act with the "highest good faith,"4 the
status of partners as fiduciaries of each other would seem to offer a powerful
restraint on lawyer mobility.5 Yet at least in the law firm setting, fiduciary
duties have not restricted the placement of individual interest above the
interest of the group to any meaningful degree. Perhaps this fact is because,
as the Illinois Supreme Court recently observed, "lawyers are [not] necessarily
bound by the same fiduciary constraints that apply to nonlawyer officers and
directors who are seeking to leave positions in commercial entities."6
The key to reconciling the existence of fiduciary standards with wide-
spread grabbing and leaving activities is to recognize that fiduciary duties
function to restrain rather than to eliminate the pursuit of private advantage
by law partners.7 The power of the fiduciary norm is the restraint it imposes
on the process by which partners pursue opportunities outside their firms.
The distinction between motive and process is critical to a realistic application
of fiduciary duties. Grabbing and leaving is not in itself a breach of fiduciary
duty because no partner is permanently bound to a firm. The manner in which
partners plan for and implement withdrawals, on the other hand, is subject to
the constraints imposed on them by virtue of their status as fiduciaries.
Although inconsistent with some expressions of the obligation of undi-
vided loyalty,8 the idea that an individual may terminate a fiduciary relation-
3. Graubard Mollen Horowitz Pomeranz & Shapiro v. Moskovitz, 565 N.Y.S.2d 672,
674 (App. Div. 1990), aff'dsub nom. Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653
N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1995).
4. Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) (en banc).
5. Cf Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 829-30 (1983) ("Courts
regulate fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon them. This moral theme is an
important part of fiduciary law. Loyalty, fidelity, faith, and honor form its basic vocabulary.").
6. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358, 364-65 (111. 1998). As Professor
DeMott has observed, the fiduciary norm "is inevitably tied to the particular context in which
it arises." Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis ofFiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 909. She explains:
Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American
law. Applicable in a variety of contexts, and apparently developed through a
jurisprudence of analogy rather than principle, the fiduciary constraint on a party's
discretion to pursue self-interest resists tidy categorization. Although one can
identify common core principles offiduciary obligation, these principles apply with
greater or lesser force in different contexts involving different parties and relation-
ships. Recognition that the law of fiduciary obligation is situation-specific should
be the starting point for any further analysis.
Id. at 879.
7. On the origins of the phrase "grabbing and leaving," see LAWYER MOBILITY, supra
note 1, § 1.1 n.3.
8. See In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 235-36 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) ("A partner's
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ship for the purpose of pursuing other opportunities is neither unusual nor
new. The venerable Restatement (Second) of Agency, for example, informs
us that the agent must act solely for the benefit of the principal and not in
competition with the principal in all matters connected with the agency.9
Even the Restatement recognizes, however, that the agent is permitted to make
plans, in secret, to compete with the principal in the future,"0 and that after
termination of employment the agent may not only compete with the
principal" but also may use certain information acquired during the course of
the agency in competition with the principal. 2
The problem, then, is managing the transition from present fiduciary to
future competitor. Given the sheer volume of disputes arising among former
law partners, the law firm offers a splendid model for testing and, perhaps,
restating ancient expressions of partner duties that are long on generalities, but
disturbingly short on specifics. Along this line, many recent reported cases
address the duties of partners withdrawing from law firms. 3 Individually, the
cases are often insightful, but as a whole there has yet to emerge from the
reported decisions a coherent set of principles useful in defining duties
(fiduciary and otherwise) owed by partners withdrawing from law firms. This
Article attempts to provide a framework helpful in defining and giving mean-
ing to those duties.
The framework offered is expressed through a statement of "General
Principles" that expresses core ideas rather than a detailed code of conduct. 4
When appropriate, I have drawn the principles from case law or other sources
with some authoritative or persuasive weight. When case law is conflicting
or nonexistent, the principles simply reflect my view of the appropriate
standard for the issue addressed. Commentary follows the major divisions in
the principles. For most purposes relevant to this discussion, the choice of
fiduciary duty includes the duty to be candid concerning business opportunities, the duty to be
fair, the duty not to put self-interests before the interests of the partnership, and the duty not to
compete with the partnership in the business of the partnership." (citation omitted)).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387, 393 (1958).
10. See id. § 393 cmt. e.
11. See id. § 396(a).
12. See id. § 396(b).
13. The rapid development of case law on issues involving lawyer mobility is impressive.
My first book on the subject, published early in 1990, cited atotal of 82 cases. See ROBERTW.
HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPs: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF GRABBING AND LEAVING 279-81
(1990). In 1994, the successor edition, Lawyer Mobility, was published in loose-leaf format to
accommodate the steady evolution of legal doctrine in the area. The new edition of Lawyer
Mobility, published in 1998, cites more than 300 reported opinions addressing issues arising in
law firm breakups.
14. In fact, each of the principles would support a full article.
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an associational form for a law firm - whether it is partnership, corporation,
limited liability company, or some variation - will not affect the substance of
the duties being outlined. Although I frequently use the term "partner," I do
not limit its application to situations in which the firm is organized as a
partnership. Regardless of the associational form, equity members of firms
tend to think of themselves as "partners," and it is in this generalized sense
that the term is used here.
Admittedly, this functional and broad view of partners is somewhat at
odds with the proliferation of statutes purporting to offer participants in
business and professional ventures real choices in organizational forms for
their associations. In recent years, the statutory law of business associations
has become more detailed and varied. On a qualitative level, however, the
considerable legislative and law reform activity that has taken place has done
little to define the nature and quality of the relationships that exist among
individuals associated in a business venture or professional practice. Thus,
it falls upon the courts to continue to articulate core values, duties, and rights
that transcend the associational label adopted by the participants.
A related point of generalization concerns the term "client." For the sake
of clarity, I employ a unitary view of a client that recognizes only one will and
voice for each client. Some clients, of course, are much more complex than the
unitary view recognizes. Corporate and institutional clients, for example, may
have many layers of employees that interact with various attorneys in a law
firm. In such cases, the loyalties of the client may be mixed, or even divided,
and it may be superficial to speak of the "choice" of the client concerning legal
representation. Admittedly, basic agency principles may resolve issues con-
ceming authority to bind the client and may make a unitary view of the client
workable. Nevertheless, the unitary view and the agency model that supports
it may disguise the very dynamic relationships that often exist between various
actors who represent a client and their contact points at law firms. 5
A final point of generalization concerns the very concept of a "partner-
ship agreement." Many disputes among former law partners arise because the
partners never took the time to develop a comprehensive agreement defining
their mutual rights and duties. Such an agreement could resolve many of the
issues addressed in this Article. Lawyer-litigants are justly criticized for
failing to have in place the prophylactic measures that they never allow their
own clients to discard. There is a danger, however, in simply deferring to a
partnership agreement as if it represents the product of an arms-length, bilat-
15. See, e.g., In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226,234-35 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) ("The record
even reflects that certain lower level State Farm claims personnel would have chosen [the
withdrawing partner] to continue handling some of his cases, although higher State Farm
management eventually directed all the work to remain with the... firm.").
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eral negotiation between sophisticated parties. Particularly in the case of
larger firms where partners are admitted on a continuing basis, the partnership
agreement may more closely resemble a constitutional document than a nego-
tiated agreement. Newly-admitted partners may have little or no opportunity
to participate in the development of the agreement, which is presented as a
"take-it-or-leave-it" condition to entry into the partnership.16 This is not to
deny the status of such a document as a contract or to suggest that its terms are
not binding. It is to suggest, however, that the view of a partnership agree-
ment as a product of negotiation among all of the partners does not comport
with the reality of the modem large law firm.
I. Planning for Withdrawal
A. Contemplation of Withdrawal
A partner generally has no duty to disclose to other partners in
a firm that the partner is considering withdrawal from the firm.
There is a certain whimsical quality to the suggestion that a partner's
state of mind raises fiduciary duty issues. Yet the duty of a fiduciary is said
to be one of "undivided loyalty."17 Thoughts may eventually be expressed
through actions, which raises the interesting and difficult question of the point
at which the thoughts must be expressed to those to whom the partner must be
loyal."
A reasonably safe starting point may be found in the proposition that a
partner merely considering withdrawal from a firm generally has no affirma-
tive duty to disclose the possibility of withdrawal to the other partners.
Actions that often parallel the consideration of withdrawal - including spe-
cific acts of planning for withdrawal, solicitations of clients, and disclosures
of information to sources outside the partnership - are addressed in later
principles.1 The present principle concerns only the state of mind of the
partner prior to the time a decision to withdraw has been made and provides
that thoughts, without more, normally need not be shared with partners."
16. This point is developed more fully in Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within
Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 441-42 (1987).
17. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
18. Cf Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of
Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65, 65 (1994) ("Unlike a fiduciary
dealing with her beneficiary, parties negotiating at arm's length are not obliged to be candid
with each other .... To a considerable extent, parties who deal at arm's length are free to take
a sporting view of their relationship with each other.").
19. See infra Parts II-111.
20. Admittedly, the generality ofa principle addressing contemplation ofwithdrawal may
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For the most part, the partnership statutes fail to support general affirma-
tive disclosure obligations applicable to partners merely considering with-
drawing from their firms. In its principal fiduciary provision, the Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA) provides that "[p]artners shall render on demand true
and full information of all things affecting the partnership to any partner."21
Setting aside situations involving self-dealing in transactions with the partner-
ship and receipt of undisclosed benefits,' case law for the most part does not
support extensive affirmative disclosure obligations under the UPA.2
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), on the other hand,
departs from the UPA and attempts to create affirmative disclosure obligations
under certain circumstances. It provides:
Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a partner... (1) with-
out demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and
affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights
and duties under the partnership agreement or this [Act]; and (2) on de-
mand, any other information concerning the partnership's business and
affairs, except to the extent the demand or the information demanded is
unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances.24
In addition, the Official Comments accompanying RUPA Section 403(c)
note that in some cases disclosure obligations may arise independently of the
information rights created by Section 403 because of the obligation of partners
prove problematic in some cases. "Considering" a withdrawal may mean anything from the
occasional, random thoughts of leaving that come to most partners, to the evaluation of a
specific offer of affiliation with another firm, to acceptance in principle of the offer of affilia-
tion. Where a partner's "thoughts" fall on this continuum is relevant to the issue of whether a
disclosure duty exists.
21. UNi. PARTNERSHIP Acr (1914) § 20 [hereinafter UPA] (emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., Starr v. International Realty, Ltd., 533 P.2d 165, 169 (Or. 1975) (finding
that failure of partner to disclose side compensation was illegal).
23. See generally Allan W. Vestal, "Ask Me No Questions and I'll Tell You No Lies":
Statutory and Common-Law Disclosure Requirements Within High-Tech Joint Ventures, 65
TuL. L. REv. 705 (1991). Professor Vestal correctly observes that "[fior the disclosure obliga-
tion to arise [under UPA § 20], there must be a predicate demand by another partner." Id. at
726. But cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958):
[A]n agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal
information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has
notice, the principal would desire to have and which can be communicated without
violating a superior duty to a third person.
Id.
24. REVIsED UiquF. PARTNERsrI AcT (1994) § 403(c) [hereinafter RUPA] (emphasis
added). In support of RUPA's expansion of disclosure obligations, see Allan W. Vestal, The
Disclosure Obligations ofPartners lnterSe Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of1994:
Is the Contractarian Revolution Failing?, 36 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1559, 1577-79(1995).
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under Section 404(d) to discharge their duties in good faith.' Interestingly,
neither the information rights outlined in Section 403 nor the duty of good
faith and fair dealing specified in Section 404 creates a duty that is, strictly
speaking, "fiduciary" in character.26
A predicate for RUPA's affirmative disclosure obligation under Section
403 is that a partner has information concerning the business and affairs of the
partnership. An economist may observe that when one partner possesses
information needed by other partners, and the costs of obtaining the informa-
tion through other sources are high, it is sensible to place the duty to make the
information available to others on the low-cost provider of the information.
Mere consideration of withdrawal, however, is not information in the posses-
sion of the partner that triggers the Section 403(c) disclosure obligation.
Contemplation without more is soft or speculative "information," and manda-
tory disclosure would not spare other partners the high costs of securing the
information from other sources (because in most cases the information simply
would not be obtainable).
At some point, however, thoughts of withdrawal crystallize into an intent
to withdraw that may trigger disclosure obligations. The point at which that
occurs, as well as other circumstances that may trigger disclosure obligations,
are addressed below.
B. Disclosure of Intent to Withdraw
L Notice of Withdrawal
A partner should provide reasonable notice of intent to with-
draw from a firm. Relevant factors in evaluating the reason-
ableness of notice include:
(a) Past practices concerning withdrawals from the firm;
(b) Compliance with notice provisions of a partnership
agreement;
25. See RUPA § 403(c) cmt. 3. RUPA § 404(d) provides that"[a] partner shall discharge
the duties to the partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership
agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing." Id. § 404(d).
26. As Dean Weidner has observed:
Ironically, even though RUPA does not recognize the duty to provide information
as a "fiduciary" duty, it makes the duty stronger than it was under the UPA. Indeed,
the one area in which RUPA has expanded what courts traditionally considered
fiduciary obligation has been in information rights .... The big change in section
403 is the elimination of the need to make a demand for information. Because
section 403 states a duty to provide information "without demand," it constitutes
a powerful new affirmative duty to disclose.
Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty, 54 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 877,911-
12 (1997).
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(c) The possibility of retribution from the firm that may
directly or indirectly harm clients; and
(d) The promptness with, which a partner discloses an
intent to withdraw after that intent has been formed.
Normally, issues concerning the adequacy of notice, including the point
at which a partner who has resolved to leave a firm must communicate that
intent to the other partners, may be resolved under a reasonableness standard,
the meaning of which will vary from firm to firm.
Firms differ widely in their practices and preferences on notice issues.
At one extreme are firms that contractually impose lengthy notice periods,
perhaps as long as six months. Delayed departure may be in the interest of the
firm if it extends the period during which income generated by the departing
partner is income to the firm. Atthe other extreme, some firms prefer partners
who have announced their withdrawal to leave immediately. A quick exit
policy may be explained by pique at the newly-discovered perfidy of a partner
or may be the product of a more calculated decision to deny a departing
partner further access to firm resources and client files. The policies and
preferences of most firms fall somewhere between the two extremes of no
notice period and a lengthy notice period. Given this diversity, firm custom
measured by past practice may be helpful in determining what constitutes
reasonable notice for a particular firm.
Many partnership agreements include provisions specifying what is
required by way of notice ofwithdrawal. 7 In such cases, compliance with the
bargain of the parties should define the extent of the duty of the partner to
give reasonable notice, although a past practice of departing from the terms
of an agreement is relevant in defining what is reasonable in terms of notice.28
Conversely, a partnership agreement that fails to include any requirements
concerning notice of withdrawal may reflect the unstated understanding of the
parties that notice need not be given.
27. RUPA allows the partnership agreement to require that notice of withdrawal be in
writing. See RUPA § 103(b)(6). The Act is unclear on the effect of oral notice when written
notice is required by the agreement. See generally ROBERT W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. VEsTAL &
DONALD J. WEIDNER, GENERAL AND LnVITED LLABiLITY PARTNERSHIPS UNDER THE REVISED
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 196-97 (1996).
28. Agreed notice provisions are often shortened in practice. See, e.g., Meehan v.
Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1263 n.12 (Mass. 1989) (noting that although agreement
required 90 days notice parties agreed to shorten period to 30 days); Spayd v. Turner, Granzow
& Hollenkamp, 482 N.E.2d 1232, 1239 (Ohio 1985) (finding that necessity of written notice
required by partnership agreement was "clearly waived" in light of findings that "Spayd
voluntarily expressed his desire to terminate his relationship with the partnership, and... all
of the partners were aware of Spayd's intent to leave the firm"). But cf. Willard v. Cowen &
Co., No. 105755/97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1997) (enjoining partner withdrawing from securities firm
from working for competing firms until expiration of 120-day notice period required by
partnership agreement).
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Some firms respond to departure announcements by locking out the
"defecting" or "disloyal" partners and denying them access to offices, clients,
and resources needed to support their clients.29 The likelihood of such con-
duct and its probable impact on the departing attorney's clients may be
considered in assessing whether any notice of withdrawal is required.
A particularly difficult situation may arise when a lawyer reaches an
agreement to join another firm but delays informing the present firm of an
intent to withdraw. Unless other factors discussed here mitigate against
announcement of withdrawal (for example, reasonable fear of retribution that
may harm the interests of clients), a partner should announce an intent to
withdraw promptly after reaching a commitment to join another firm or other-
wise reaching a decision to leave the firm. The concealment of a decision to
withdraw may be the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim ifa causal link
can be shown between the deception and subsequent damage to the firm.3'
2. Disclosure of the Possibility of Withdrawal
A partner seriously considering withdrawal should so advise
other partners if they are about to make a material decision or
29. The most famous lockout was implemented by Melvin Belli. As to why on the day
after Christmas he locked out his partner of 28 years, Belli explained that the way to protect
yourself against partners departing with clients is "to kick 'em in the ass and throw 'em out.
Lock the doors, and see to it that they can't take the cases." Mary Ann Galante, For Firms,
Breaking Up is Hard to Do, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 1.
Other accounts of lockouts appear, with some regularity, in reported opinions and the
legal press. See, e.g., Hellerv. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336,349 (Ct. App.
1996) (rejecting claim of expelled partner that following conduct was sufficiently outrageous
to support claim of emotional distress: canceling partner's key card, denying him access to
computers, threatening to put padlock on his door if he was not out by noon next day, posting
security guard at his door and instructing guard not to leave partner unattended); Warner v.
Carimi Law Firm, 678 So. 2d 561, 562 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that firm changed locks on
door and denied partner access to office and files); Mary Hull, Out of His League: Racetrack
Bid is Counsel's Downfall, TEX. LAW., July 12, 1993, at 1 (reporting that complaint had been
filed with State Bar of Texas by lawyer accusing his former partner of locking him out of office
and stealing client files).
30. See, e.g., Kantor v. Bernstein, 640 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (App. Div. 1996).
[T]he amended complaint alleges that defendant partner... went to defendant law
firm and offered them virtually all of plaintiff's class action arbitration practice in
exchange for making him a partner..., and that defendant partner's pre-resigna-
tion discussions with his prospective new firm included a surreptitious pre-resigna-
tion agreement that defendant firm would assist defendant partner in concealing the
true nature of their actions from plaintiff until his resignation. This constitutes an
adequate pleading of a breach of defendant partner's fiduciary duty to plaintiff.
Id. (citation omitted).
31. Damages normally are necessary in order for a breach of fiduciary duty claim to be
actionable. See infra notes 66-72 'and accompanying text.
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commitment of resources in reliance on the partner's continued
membership in the firm.
Distinct from the necessity of providing reasonable notice following the
formation of an intent to withdraw from a law firm is the issue of whether a
disclosure obligation may arise before the decision to withdraw is finalized.
Normally, the duty to disclose withdrawal plans does not arise before a
partner actually has decided to withdraw from a firm. As discussed above,
musings prior to this point, or even steps taken to explore withdrawal options,
generally do not trigger disclosure obligations. 2 Under some circumstances,
however, it may be reasonable to expect a partner to disclose the possibility
of withdrawal. In particular, when the firm is making a material decision or
commitment of resources in reliance on the partner's continued membership
in the firm, a partner seriously contemplating withdrawal should so inform
other partners.33
Law firms make and implement business plans. They hire employees,
open branch offices, lease office space, purchase office equipment, and make
other commitments of resources based on information available at the time.
A subsequent departure by one or more partners, clients in tow, may in retro-
spect reveal those decisions to be ill advised. If a partner secretly planning a
withdrawal knows that decisions of a material nature are being made by the
partnership in reliance upon the partner's continued participation in the firm,
the imposition of a duty to disclose the possibility of withdrawal may be
appropriate.34
3. Responding Truthfully to Inquiries
A partner should respond truthfully to good faith inquiries
made by other partners concerning the partner's plans for
withdrawal.
A partner actively planning a withdrawal should respond truthfully to
good faith inquiries concerning departure plans. For this purpose, good faith
may be measured by reference to the reason for making the inquiry, such as
rumors within the firm concerning the possible withdrawal of the partner.35
32. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
33. Cf Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 936 (Cal. 1966) ("There is no
requirement that an officer disclose his preparations to compete with the corporation in every
case, and failure to disclose such acts will render the officer liable for a breach of his fiduciary
duties only where particular circumstances render nondisclosure harmful to the corporation.").
34. This proposition is particularly true when the partner actively participates in the
planning that is premised on the partner's continued participation in the firm.
35. Cf Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255,1259 (Mass. 1989) (noting that partner
three times falsely denied rumors about his departure).
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To allow partners to falsely deny the rumors would be to condone "lying to
partners," a proposition unlikely to find acceptance among many courts36 even
if a remedy for the wrong would likely prove elusive.37
C. Making Logistical Arrangements in Anticipation of Withdrawal
A partner may make plans to leave a firm prior to announcing
the withdrawal to the other partners. Such plans may include
logistical pre-departure arrangements such as arranging bank
financing or locating alternative space and affiliations.
At first glance, it may seem difficult to reconcile a partner's duty of
loyalty to other partners with the same partner secretly making plans to com-
pete with the partnership in the future. Yet the commentary to the Restate-
ment (Second) ofAgency recognizes that an agent may, consistent with loyalty
obligations owed to the principal, "make arrangements to compete."3 More
recently and to the point, the Massachusetts high court observed in Meehan
v. Shaughnessy:39
Here, the judge found that Meehan and Boyle made certain logistical
arrangements for the establishment of [their new law firm]. These arrange-
ments included executing a lease for an office, preparing lists of clients
expected to leave Parker Coulter for [their new firm], and obtaining fmanc-
ing on the basis of these lists. We believe these logistical arrangements to
establish a physical plant for the new firm were permissible, especially in
light of the attorneys' obligation to represent adequately any clients who
might continue to retain them on their departure from Parker Coulter.
40
36. See Graubard Mollen Dannet& Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1182-83
(N.Y. 1995) (finding that lying to partners about plans to leave was not consistent with partner's
fiduciary duties); see also In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 237 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (stating
that fact that partner "[w]hen caught... was not forthright about his intent to withdraw from
the firm" was factor supporting imposition of disciplinary sanction of public reprimand).
37. An actionable claim against the partner may fail for lack of actual damages caused by
the misrepresentations. On the importance of damages, see infra notes 66-72 and accompanying
text.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 cmt. e (1958). The full comment states:
Even before the termination of the agency, [the agent] is entitled to make arrange-
ments to compete, except that he cannot properly use confidential information
peculiar to his employer's business and acquired therein. Thus, before the end of
his employment, he can properly purchase a rival business and upon termination of
employment immediately compete. He is not, however, entitled to solicit customers
for such rival business before the end of his employment nor can he properly do
other similar acts in direct competition with the employer's business.
Id.
39. 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989).
40. Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1264 (Mass. 1989) (citation omitted).
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If, as Meehan suggests, there may exist an obligation to clients to make
appropriate arrangements in anticipation ofa withdrawal it is "simple common
sense," in the words of the New York Court of Appeals, that such planning is
a delicate venture requiring confidentiality.4
There are significant limits, however, on the range ofpermissible planning
activities taken in anticipation of withdrawal. In particular, the disclosure of
information concerning the firm or its clients to third parties poses special
difficulties more fully addressed below.42 Also discussed below are limitations
on the solicitation of clients43 and the recruitment of staff (including associate
attorneys) from the firm from which the attorney is withdrawing.'
II. Notification and Solicitation of Clients
A. Notification and Solicitation of Clients Prior to
Announcement of Departure
A partner planning to withdraw from a firm should not solicit
clients (that is, attempt to secure their commitments to retain
the lawyer or a new firm) before informing the firm of the part-
ner's intent to withdraw.
A lawyer considering withdrawing from a firm may desire the comfort
of commitments from clients that they will remain with the lawyer.45 In addi-
tion to providing assurances to the lawyer of ongoing revenue, client commit-
ments may be of great importance to third parties. The bank considering
financing the lawyer's practice, the landlord considering leasing the lawyer
space, and the firm considering bringing the lawyer into its partnership each
may desire some level of comfort concerning the income likely to follow the.
41. See Graubard, 653 N.E.2d at 1183.
At one end of the spectrum, where an attorney is dissatisfied with the existing
association, taking steps to locate alternative space and affiliations would not
violate a partner's fiduciary duties. That this may be a delicate venture, requiring
confidentiality, is simple common sense and well illustrated by the eruption caused
by defendants' announced resignation in the present case.
Id.; see Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358, 366 (Il1. 1998) (citing Graubard
favorably and noting that lawyers who are planning to leave firm "may take preliminary
logistical steps of obtaining office space and supplies [but] may not solicit clients for their new
venture").
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra Part II.
44. See infra Part V.
45. Although this discussion assumes that it is lawyers who solicit clients, nonlawyers
also may be involved in solicitation activities. See Kucker Kraus & Bruh, LLP v. Szold &
Brandwen, P.C.,N.Y.L.J., Sept. 12, 1997, at26 col.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (discussing postdeparture
solicitation by paralegal).
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lawyer. The risk associated with the uncertainty of client loyalties may be
minimized rather easily through the simple measure of seeking the commit-
ment of clients to follow the lawyer from the firm. Indeed, the ease of secur-
ing the information combined with its value may prompt the lawyer's solicita-
tion of clients prior to informing the firm of plans to withdraw.
Business reasons for securing commitments aside, courts are consistent
in viewing the solicitation of clients prior to the announcement of departure
as a breach of the loyalty obligations of a partner.46 Covert solicitation of
clients differs from other forms of planning for withdrawal, such as arranging
bank financing or exploring new affiliations,47 because it is a direct act of
competition with the firm.48 Planning for competition may be consistent with
fiduciary responsibilities, but actual competition is not.49 The point is made
forcefully by the New York Court of Appeals in GraubardMollen Dannett &
Horowitz v. Moskovitz:50
[P]reresignation surreptitious "solicitation" offirm clients for a partner's
personal gain ... is actionable. Such conduct exceeds what is necessary
to protect the important value of client freedom of choice in legal represen-
tation, and thoroughly undermines another important value - the loyalty
owed partners (including law partners), which distinguishes partnerships
(including law partnerships) from bazaars."
Graubard rests on the assumption, explicit in the quoted statement, that
clients "belong to the firm" rather than its members. Although the assumption
is critical to restricting solicitation activities, it ignores the reality that clients
are not "assets" susceptible to ownership.52 To the contrary, clients are
46. See generally Vowell & Meelheim, P.C. v. Beddow, Erben & Bowen, P.A., 679 So.
2d 637 (Ala. 1996); Dowd & Dowd, 693 N.E.2d 358; Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d
1255 (Mass. 1989); Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179
(N.Y. 1995); LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 1, §§ 3.2, 4.8.
47. See supra Part I.C.
48. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358,366 (Ill. 1998) ("The case law
supports the trial judge's view... that while lawyers who are planning to leave a firm may take
preliminary logistical steps of obtaining office space and supplies, they may not solicit clients
for their new venture.").
49. In the past, legal ethics provided an additional source of restraints on solicitation
activities. For a discussion of the demise of ethics restrictions, see LAWYER MOBILITY, supra
note 1, § 2.2.
50. 653 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1995).
51. Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (N.Y.
1995) (emphasis added).
52. Cf Williams & Montgomery, Ltd. v. Stellato, 552 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) The trial court stated:
I am satisfied that there is no protectable interest. I am satisfied that they have no
protectable interest in clients per se; that they do not own clients, nor can they
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consumers of legal services, free to choose the identity of the providers of
those services.53 Some clients hire the firm, but others "hire the lawyer rather
than the firm."54 Given this reality, references to the firm's clients must be
have - nor can they expect to protect the constant - affections isn't the right word,
but constant expectations of representation of these clients such that could be
protected by the courts.
Id
53. On the right of clients to choose their lawyers, see LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 1,
§ 2.3.1.
54. This is particularly true of sophisticated clients and is evident from the comments of
those who hire the lawyers. In a Corporate Legal Times Roundtable, Francesca M. Maher of
United Air Lines stated: "[T]he old adage that you don't hire the firm, you hire the lawyer is
so true. And I want the lawyer who's working on my matters day-in and day-out to have that
service mentality. It's just so important to making sure that our needs are met." Successfully
Moving Up: Hiring in Times of Change: Tipsfor the Restless, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 1996,
at 44. An article by the senior VP and general counsel of MMI Companies, Inc. stated: "I have
used the term 'hire firms.' I believe the old adage applies; companies do not hire firms, they
hire lawyers. We have all lost clients when a partner leaves and takes a number of clients to the
new firm." Wayne A. Sinclair, Quality Client Service: The Times TheyAre a Changin,4 NO.
3 LEGAL MALPRACrICE REP. 1994, at 7-8.
A Chicago Lawyer/Coopers & Lybrand Environmental Law Survey, as reported in
Chicago Lawyer, reveals similar attitudes:
When hiring, [PeterJ.] Kelly [associate general counsel, environmental, Waste
Management, Inc.] looks at the individual: "It rarely has anything to do with the
firm," he said. If multi-party insurance or multi-party toxic tort litigation is in-
volved, then he might be "driven by critical mass firm size." Kelly sounds like
many general counsel who answered the survey.
"Alaska has a very thin community of people who are good in environmental
law," ARCO's [William] Christian [senior attorney for ARCO Alaska, Inc.] said.
"It's not even firms; its people we rely on and trust and use frequently ...."'
Law firms and in-house counsel were asked to assess the importance of various
factors in selecting outside counsel. The individual lawyer's reputation is the most
important factor, both law firms and general counsel agree .... "Let's face it.
Good law firms are a dime a dozen. All across the country are many good law
firms. So, it boils down to personal relationships, and past experience and their
responsiveness; and that's not just in environmental law."
Donna Berkman & Harvey Gill, Air, Earth and Water: Environmental Law in the 1990s, CHI.
LAW., Nov. 1992, at 4; see Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A
DemandSide Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 902 (1990) (stating that "[l]ong-term relation-
ships give way to retention of counsel in connection with discrete specialized transactions;
clients select their own specialists; and the rule becomes to hire lawyers, not firms"). Professors
Gilson and Mnookin explain that
sophisticated general counsel, for whom the costs of direct investigation of quality
are relatively lower, are less likely than corporate executives to pay a premium
because of a firm's general reputation. Often, they can efficiently search for and
hire a particular lawyer, a process made easier by the recent increased pooling of
information concerning the past performances by law firms. The catchphrase now
is, "Shop for a lawyer, not a law firm" ....
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viewed with some skepticism.
Because client loyalties may run in many directions - including to the
firm, to one or more lawyers in the firm, or to the firm and one or more of its
lawyers - the wrong Graubard targets is not the "looting" of firm assets but,
as the opinion states, the "surreptitious" efforts to solicit clients. Not competi-
tion itself but the fairness of the conditions of competition is the proper
subject of inquiry. Once a partner announces plans to leave a firm, the firm
is on notice that its relationship with certain clients may be at risk. That
knowledge, in turn, may give the firm an "equal opportunity," at least in
theory, to compete with the departing partner for the loyalties of the clients.5
Accordingly, an important distinction exists between solicitation that occurs
before and solicitation that occurs after a partner announces plans to leave a
firm.
Merely informing a client of the potential of withdrawal is not necessar-
ily a solicitation of the client. Some clients are interested in the affiliations
of their lawyers and reasonably expect to be informed of possible changes in
those affiliations. 6 This is particularly true of more sophisticated clients.
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, SharingAmong the Human Capitalists: An Economic
Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313,
385 (1985).
Jake Krocheski, consultant with the Dallas office of Hildebrandt Inc., notes that
clients have become more sophisticated buyers of legal services over the past few
years .... Clients are more frequently hiring specialists. With an ever-increasing
number of lawyers, specialization has become one way for lawyers to distinguish
themselves from competitors. Clients are hiring lawyers not law firms. Clients are
more closely managing their outside counsel.
Jake Krocheski, Pricing and Collection So Clients Can Pay Up, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 9, 1993, at 5.
Some commentators believe that client attitudes may be shifting. Quoted in another
roundtable:
[Andrew R.] Laidlaw, Seyfarth Shaw [Fairweather & Geraldson]: This relates
back to your earlier question about market shift. The market for hiring law firm
counsel is shifting back to hiring for the reputation of the firm as a whole.
All our clients are becoming very sophisticated and are making their buying
decisions on different criteria from five or 10 years ago. One phenomenon... is
clients are starting to hire firms again, not just individual attorneys.
Five or 10 years ago, common wisdom was clients chose individual lawyers as
opposed to firms. Our clients still focus on the skills of the particular lawyers, but
they have become much more interested than previously in the firm they're hiring.
Firms Raise the Bar on Lateral Partner Hiring: More Emphasis on Strategic Planning Than
Money, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1997, at 2.
55. Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1267 (Mass. 1989) ("This disclosure will
allow the partnership and the departing partner an equal opportunity to present to clients the
option of continuing with the partnership or retaining the departing partner individually.").
56. Indeed, on occasion the change in affiliation may be at the insistence of one or more
of a lawyer's clients.
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When the relationship between a lawyer and client is such that the client
would expect to be informed of the lawyer's possible withdrawal from a firm,
the lawyer may so inform the client. Indeed, when a lawyer's withdrawal
from a firm may affect the interests of a client, the lawyer may reasonably feel
under some compulsion to keep the client informed.57
Although a distinction exists between soliciting and merely informing a
client, in practice the two activities may quickly merge. A client informed of
a lawyer's plans may offer spontaneous assurances of loyalty to the lawyer.
That commitment in turn may greatly facilitate the lawyer's planning for
withdrawal from the firm. In other words, what the lawyer could not accom-
plish directly through solicitation may be accomplished indirectly as a product
(perhaps planned and foreseeable) of the process of keeping a client informed.
The result could be avoided by banning all communications to the client on
the subject of withdrawal until after the lawyer has notified the firm, but the
justification for such a restriction on communications with clients is not at all
apparent.
B. Notification and Solicitation of Clients After Announcement of
Plans to Withdraw
1. Following a partner's announcement of plans to withdraw
from a firm, the partner may solicit clients of the firm with
whom the partner has a professional relationship if each of
the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) Sufficient time has elapsed following the announcement
to allow the firm an equal opportunity to compete for
clients;
(b) The solicitation is not done in secret; and
(c) The client is advised or otherwise aware that it is free to
choose the current firm or the partner's new firm (or
any other lawyer or firm).
2. Both the firm and the withdrawing partner have a duty to
ensure that clients for whom the withdrawing partner is
providing representation are informed of the withdrawal
57. Cf. MODELRULFs OFPROFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(a) (1983) [hereinafterMODEL
RULES] ("A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."). Recently, the Legal Ethics
Committee of the District of Columbia Bar Association issued an ethics opinion suggesting that
Rule 1.4 may give rise to a duty to inform clients of"[an attorney's] planned departure and of
the lawyer's prospective new affiliation." See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 273 (1997).
In a qualification severely limiting this point, however, the opinion adds that partnership law
may affect duties in this regard and that a lawyer may have an obligation to inform the firm of
a departure "at or around the time the lawyer so notifies clients." Id.
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and have an opportunity to make an informed choice of
counsel.
3. When possible and appropriate, a law firm and withdrawing
partner should cooperate to the end of providing joint notice
of the withdrawal to clients.
Ethics standards and case law for some time have prohibited covenants
not to compete in law firm partnership agreements.58 The ban exists princi-
pally to protect the freedom of clients to choose their lawyers59 and second-
arily to facilitate the mobility and career development of lawyers.60 Impor-
tantly, however, most discussions of restrictive covenants have rejected their
enforcement in the context ofpost-withdrawal competition for clients. At the
other extreme, fiduciary duties prohibit a partner from soliciting clients before
informing the firm of plans to withdraw.6 Between the two extremes lies the
period between a partner's announcement of intent to withdraw from the firm
and the actual date of withdrawal.
It would be possible to prohibit any solicitation of clients until the lawyer
has actually withdrawn from the partnership and is no longer a member of the
firm. Such a rule would give effect to the fiduciary nature of the relationship
among partners. Preservation of the fiduciary norm, however, would be
accomplished at the expense of clients. Deferring the point of permissible
solicitation to the time following withdrawal from the firm would deny clients
material information concerning the changing affiliations of their lawyers and
shorten the period during which clients could carefully explore all of their
options. To preserve the fiduciary relationship among partners, the ideal that
clients should be able to choose their lawyers without pressure and with the
benefit of full information would be undermined.
Prohibiting solicitation of clients prior to the point of actual withdrawal
is unnecessary to protect the interests of the firm in "its" client base. Follow-
58. Dwyer v. Jung, 348 A.2d 208,208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (holding restric-
tive covenant in partnership agreementvoid as matter ofpublic policy). See, e.g., MODELRLES,
supra note 57, Rule 5.6 (prohibiting contractual restraints on competition following termination
of relationship among partners). See generally LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 1, § 2.3.3.
59. See, e.g., Pettingell v. Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, 687N.E.2d 1237, 1239 (Mass.
1997) (finding restraints on competition unenforceable because "[tlhe law should provide the
fullest possible freedom of choice to clients").
60. Most courts have treated as the equivalent ofrestrictive covenants economic disincen-
tives to competition, such as withdrawal payout provisions in partnership agreements that
reduce or eliminate the payment to withdrawing partners who compete with their firms. But cf
Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 156 (Cal. 1993) (suggesting that "reasonable toll" on
competition would be enforceable). On economic disincentives to competition, see LAWYER
MOBILITY, supra note 1, § 2.3.4. See generally Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607
A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
61. See supra Part II.A.
1014
LOYALTY IN THE FIRM
ing a lawyer's announcement of plans to withdraw from a firm, the firm and
the departing lawyer are on an equal footing, in theory, to compete for clients.
On learning of a partner's planned departure, the firm is in a position to
compete with the departing partner for the loyalties of clients.62 The act that
enables the solicitation by the departing partner is the notification of with-
drawal rather than the withdrawal itself. Firm resources, of course, should not
be used in furtherance of the partner's solicitation activities.
It is the client that chooses the lawyer rather than the lawyer who chooses
the client. The turmoil and corresponding confusion often associated with
partner withdrawals should not undermine the right of the client to make an
informed and unpressured choice of legal counsel. Both the firm and the
departing attorney have an obligation to assist the client in making an in-
formed decision.63 Ideally, a law firm and withdrawing partner will advance
this objective by cooperating to the end of providingjoint notice of the part-
ner's withdrawal to clients. A California ethics opinion outlines the content
of such a notification. It explains that
Where practical, the attorneys should providejoint notice that identifies the
withdrawing attorneys, identifies the field in which the withdrawing attor-
neys will be practicing law, gives their addresses and telephone numbers,
provides information as to whether the former firm will continue to handle
similar legal matters, and tells who will be handling ongoing matters during
the transition. The client should also be advised of his right to select the
former firm, the withdrawing attorneys, or new counsel to handle his future
legal matters, as well as of his right to obtain all files and property.64
62. But cf Miller v. Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., 699 So. 2d 729, 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (finding that employment agreement requiring withdrawing associates to wait five days
before soliciting clients is enforceable).
63. See In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 235 (Mo. 1997) (en bane).
[I]t is the responsibility of both that attorney and the law firm to ensure that the
clients for whom that attorney had provided material representation are informed
of the change in the circumstances of the clients' representation. This duty requires
communication with those clients - whether written, personal, or by some other
means - that is professional in nature and content. The primary purpose of the
communication is to assist these clients in determining whether their legal work
should remain with the law firm, be transferred to the departing attorney, or be
transferred elsewhere. While it is natural to expect both the firm and the departing
attorney to want the clients' continued legal representation, the primary purpose of
the communication is to assist the clients in their needs and not to solicit the cli-
ents' business. A failure by the attorney or the firm to fulfill this duty appropriately
may justify disciplinary action.
Id.
64. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct,
Formal Op. 1985-86 (1985) (emphasis added); see Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255,
1267 n.16 (Mass. 1989) (suggesting joint notification).
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Although joint notice of the type described in the California opinion is desir-
able, it is very much open to question whether joint notice is the rule rather
than the exception in practice, even in California.
C. Causation of Loss as an Element of the Claim for
Improper Solicitation
1. To be actionable as a breach of fiduciary duty, improper
solicitation activities must cause harm to the firm. If clients
would have remained with the departing lawyer in spite of
any improper solicitation activities, an actionable claim does
not exist.
2. The burden of proving that each client decision in this re-
gard was unaffected by improper solicitation activities is on
the departing lawyer.
A breach of fiduciary duty causing harm to the party protected by the
duty gives rise to a cause of action in tort in mostjurisdictions. The absence
of demonstrable harm flowing from the breach, however, may be fatal to the
cause of action. As typically stated, the elements of a tort cause of action for
a breach of fiduciary duty are as follows: (1) the existence of a duty; (2) a
breach of the duty owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary; and (3) harm
resulting from the breach. 5
65. See Cremi v. Brown, 955 F. Supp. 499, 524 (D. Md. 1997) ("Under Texas law, a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty has three elements: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty owed
to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) that breach was the proximate cause of the
damage to the plaintiff."); Lamonte v. Sanwa Bank Cal., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 865 (Ct. App.
1996) ("In order to plead a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against a trustee, the
plaintiff must show the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately
caused by that breach; the absence of any one of these elements is fatal to the cause of action.");
Preferred Physicians Mut. Mgt. Group v. Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention, 918 S.W.2d
805, 810 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that in order to plead cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty against trustee, "[plaintiff] must establish that a fiduciary duty existed between
it and [defendant], that [defendant] breached the duty, and that [defendant's] breach caused
[plaintiff] to suffer harm"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1977) (stating
that fiduciary is liable in tort for harm caused); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401
cmt. b (1957) (stating that claim for breach of fiduciary duty, where there is no actual harm to
plaintiff, cannot stand in tort).
Infrequently, courts have held that actual damages are not indispensable elements of a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The cases are relatively rare and do not undermine the
strength of the general proposition that damages are an essential element of the claim. In In re
Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1992), for example, the Delaware Supreme Court
rejected a lower court's conclusion that in a class action proof of individual damages was
required in a suit based on failure of fiduciary to fulfill disclosure obligations, noting: "In
Delaware existing law and policy have evolved into a virtual per se rule of damages for breach
ofthe fiduciary duty of disclosure." Id. at 333. In Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700
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Meehan v. Shaughnessy provides the most explicit discussion in case law
of causation questions that are raised by the improper solicitation of firm
clients by departing partners. Concluding that the departing partners had the
burden of"proving no causal connection between their breach of duty and [the
firm's] loss of clients,"' the court outlined the following factors as relevant
to the causation determination:67
(1) Who was responsible for initially attracting the client to the firm;
(2) Who managed the case at the firm;
(3) How sophisticated the client was and whether the client made the
decision with full knowledge; and
(4) What was the reputation and skill of the removing attorneys.68
The above factors are appropriate for evaluating causation in some but
not all solicitation situations. In Meehan, the withdrawing partners took more
than 100 contingent fee cases from the firm. A plaintiff's contingent fee
practice of the type involved in Meehan typically will involve clients of
varying degrees of sophistication who will not look to their present attorneys
for representation beyond resolution of their pending cases. A very different
type of practice is involved when clients are institutional, sophisticated, and
looking to their attorneys for ongoing representation with no defined point of
termination. Indeed, even the Meehan court noted that the existence of clients
A.2d 135 (Del. 1997), however, the court pointedly observed that Tri-Star did not generally
eliminate the need to allege and prove damages, adding that the case stood "only for the narrow
proposition that, where directors have breached their disclosure duties in a corporate transaction
that has in turn caused impairmant to the economic voting rights of stockholders, there must at
least be an award of nominal damages." Id. at 142; see Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 402
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that firm could be forced to return fee to client to whom it had
breached duty, even if client could not show harm flowing from breach); Gilcchrest v. Per, 387
N.W.2d 412, 415 (Minn. 1986) (requiring firm to forfeit fee because of breach of duty even
though client was not harmed); Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Tex. App. 1997) ("It
would be a dangerous precedent for us to say that unless some affirmative loss can be shown,
the person who has violated his fiduciary relationship with another may hold on to any secret
gain or benefit that he may have thereby acquired.").
66. Meehan, 535 N.E.2d at 1267. As support for placing the burden on withdrawing
attorneys to disprove causation, the court observed:
Proof of the circumstances of the preparations for obtaining authorizations and of
the actual communications with clients was more accessible to the [departing part-
ners than to the firm]. Furthermore, requiring these partners to disprove causation
will encourage partners in the future to disclose seasonably and fully any plans to
remove cases. This disclosure will allow the partnership and the departing partner
an equal opportunity to present to clients the option of continuing with the partner-
ship or retaining the departing partner individually.
Id.
67. Id. at 1268.
68. Id.
1017
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 997 (1998)
who are sophisticated may render less important the factors it articulated.69
The court might well have gone further and stated that in appropriate cases,
the sophistication of the client may be the only relevant factor in the analysis
of causation.
Because causation of harm is an element of the cause of action in tort for
breach of fiduciary duty, Meehan causation analysis, and its assignment of
burden in the issue, is unsurprising. Somewhat less satisfying is the court's
discussion of policy reasons supporting its decision:
[R]equiring these partners to disprove causation will encourage partners in
the future to disclose seasonably and fully any plans to remove cases. This
disclosure will allow the partnership and the departing partner an equal
opportunity to present to clients the option of continuing with the partner-
ship or retaining the departing partner individually.7"
There is at least a touch of wishful thinking in these statements. In many
cases, the burden of disproving causation will not prove difficult for with-
drawing partners. The easiest cases are the ones involving sophisticated
clients, when causation virtually disproves itself and the link between any
improper solicitation activities and harm to the firm is easily broken.
When clients are less sophisticated and the factors other than sophistica-
tion come to play, causation may turn on whether the departing lawyer was the
attorney within the firm chiefly responsible for the client's matters. A client
view of the withdrawing attorney as "my lawyer" gives the attorney a signifi-
cant advantage, to say the least, in disproving causation of harm. The benefits
of such an advantage are easy to foresee and have the effect of encouraging
attorneys to "hoard" clients rather than taking steps to promote client loyalty
to the firm or other attorneys within the firm. Doubtless, this is not a policy
objective that the Meehan court would have embraced.
There is no reason to exempt litigant law partners from causation require-
ments imposed on other plaintiffs asserting fiduciary claims. The conse-
quence of requiring causation, however, is to make it immeasurably more
difficult to state claims for improper solicitation activities. It may be clear
beyond doubt that solicitation prior to the announcement of a departure is a
breach of fiduciary duty, but the breach may lack an effective remedy in
many, perhaps even most, cases.
Even if the absence of demonstrable harm flowing from a breach is fatal
to thefirm's cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, disciplinary action
69. See id. at 1268 n.18 ("In a minor number of removed cases, the insurance defense
cases, the judge found the client was sophisticated, and made the decision to retain the
withdrawing attorneys] with full knowledge of the circumstances. In this situation, other
factors, such as who originally brought the client in, may become less significant.").
70. Id. at 1267.
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may be taken against the attorney who has improperly solicited clients without
regard to harm to the firm. The use of ethics rules as a means of defining the
obligations that lawyers in a firm have to each other has received relatively
little attention. Several recent decisions, however, suggest that the protections
of professional responsibility rules may extend to partners, as well as clients.71
Although not yet a trend, the use of disciplinary actions to define the relation-
ship of lawyers associated in a firmn inter se is increasing.72
IlI Disclosures of Firm/Client Information to Third Parties
A firm's reasonable expectation that nonpublic firm information in the
possession of a partner will not be disclosed to parties outside the firm may
be balanced in appropriate cases against the rights of attorneys to practice
their profession and the rights of clients to be represented by the lawyer of
their choice. The following principles are relevant to this balancing.73
A. In General
Nonpublic firm-specific information pertaining to the finances,
practice, and operations of a firm may not be disclosed by a
partner to third parties in competition with or to the injury of
the partner's present firm.
Rare is the case of a lawyer vho moves a practice from a firm without
disclosing to parties outside the firm some information concerning the firm
and its clients. Particularly difficult issues are raised by disclosures of
nonpublic firm information by a partner as part of the discussions and negotia-
tions with another firm concerning a possible affiliation. The information
may include data on firm profitability, the identity of clients, revenues attrib-
utable to specific clients, and resources needed in order to service clients.
From the firm's perspective, the information may be highly confidential and
71. See, e.g., In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 237 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (stating that
withdrawing partner's "violation of his duties to the... firm directly affected and endangered
the quality of representation the firm provided to [the client]"); In re Smith, 843 P.2d 449,452
(Or. 1992).
Although there is no explicit rule requiring lawyers to be candid and fair with their
partners or employers, such an obligation is implicit in the prohibition of DRI-
102(A)(3) against dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Moreover, such
conduct is a violation of the duty of loyalty owed by a lawyer to his or her firm
based on their contractual or agency relationship.
Id.
72. See generally LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 1, § 2.6.
73. The principles are offered as aids in balancing the rights and duties of partners inter
se and are not intended to define the scope of duties owed to clients.
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sensitive in nature. From the perspective of the partner considering a new
affiliation and the perspective of the firm with which the partner is having
discussions, the information may be important to defining the nature of the
partner's practice and the interests of the two parties in moving forward. To
prohibit as "disloyal" the partner's disclosure of any "confidential" firm
information to another firm would dramatically limit the ability of lawyers to
move among firms.
A partner's loyalty obligation includes the duty to maintain the confiden-
tiality of information concerning the finances, practice, and operations of a
firm when there is a reasonable expectation that the information will not be
disclosed to parties outside the firm. Ideally, there should exist a free flow of
information among partners in a firm. Because concern over leakage would
impede the flow of information, protecting the information is a loyalty obliga-
tion of the partner even if the information, strictly speaking, is not "propri-
etary" or protectable as a trade secret.
The duty not to disclose properly extends only to that information for
which there is a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. It should be noted
that evaluating the permissibility of disclosure with reference to the confiden-
tiality of the information is a standard on which disagreement is likely to exist.
Consider in this regard the comments of the California Supreme Court in a
case involving the disclosure of key employees of a corporation and their
salaries:
It is beyond question that a corporate officer breaches his fiduciary
duties when, for the purpose of facilitating the recruiting of the corpora-
tion's employees by a competitor, he supplies the competitor with a selec-
tive list ofthe corporation's employees who are, in his judgment, possessed
of both ability and the personal characteristics desirable in an employee,
together with the salary the corporation is paying the employee and a
suggestion as to the salary the competitor should offer in order to be
successful in recruitment. This conclusion is inescapable even if the
information regarding salaries is not deemed to be confidential.74
It is not all clear why information "not deemed to be confidential" should
be protected unless the improper conduct lies in the act of secret competition,
discussed above,7 rather than the act of disclosure. As to the act of disclo-
sure, the firm's reasonable expectations of confidentiality should be the
guiding standard.76
74. Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921,938-39 (Cal. 1966) (en banc) (emphasis
added).
75. See supra Part I.
76. Moreover, there is not a reasonable expectation of confidentiality when the informa-
tion is readily available from sources outside the firm, and disclosure of such information
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B. Disclosures to Parties Other than Law Firms
1. A partner may make limited disclosures of nonpublic infor-
mation concerning the firm and its clients to third parties,
other than law firms, for the purpose of facilitating contrac-
tual relationships necessary to support the partner's post-
withdrawal practice.
2. Such information must directly relate to the lawyer's prac-
tice and be of the type customarily provided in similar trans-
actions.
3. Reasonable steps should be taken to insure that the third
parties maintain the confidentiality of the information.
As discussed above, lawyers withdrawing from a firm to establish their
own firms, alone or with others, often must make "logistical" arrangements
with third parties, such as banks financing the practice and property owners
providing office space.77 Bank financing and office leasing are transactions
of considerable economic substance involving substantial commitments on the
part of the third parties, who invariably wish to analyze whether the lawyer
will generate the revenue needed to meet the obligations under the contracts.
To facilitate that analysis, the third parties may require information concern-
ing clients likely to follow the lawyer and pro forma financial statements
reflecting projected revenues and expenses. Such projections often rest on
historical data concerning revenues and expenses, which is exactly the type
of information a firm may regard as confidential.
Some disclosures of information to facilitate arrangements to move a
practice may be justified as necessary in order to provide ongoing services to
clients with a minimum of disruption. Only limited information, however,
may be disclosed to third parties. The information should directly relate to the
lawyer's practice and be of the type customarily provided in similar transac-
tions. This means, for example, that third parties should not be provided with
financial statements for the firm from which the lawyer is withdrawing. Such
information is beyond that which is'reasonably necessary for the third party
to evaluate the credit-worthiness of the lawyer. In addition, reasonable steps
should be taken to insure that third parties maintain the confidentiality of
information provided to them.78
should not be prohibited under the rubric of fiduciary duties. For example, a considerable
amount of financial information on firms is reported in the legal press. See, e.g., The Am Law
100: America's Highest-Grossing Firms in 1996, AM. LAW., July 1996 (1996 annual survey).
77. See supra Part I.C.
78. This analysis assumes that the relationship existing with a particular client does not
preclude the transmittal of information concerning the client. In the event that the client has
instructed the lawyer to maintain strictly the confidentiality of information concerning the client
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C. Disclosures to Law Firms
Limited items of confidential firm information and client-spe-
cific information may be disclosed by a partner to another firm
in connection with that partner's exploration of a possible
affiliation with the firm.
1. The information that may be disclosed to another firm is the
minimum necessary to allow the parties to assess, with gener-
ality rather than specificity:
(a) The general nature of the partner's practice;
(b) The firm's interest is accommodating that practice;
(c) The financial and personnel resources that would be
needed to support the practice;
(d) Any limitations that may exist (for example, conflict of
interest and imputed disqualification rules) that may
limit the firm's ability to represent clients of the part-
ner; and
(e) An appropriate range of compensation.
2. Reasonable care should be taken to insure that the firm to
which the information is disclosed maintains the confidenti-
ality of the information.
A partner contemplating withdrawal from a firm may make limited dis-
closures of confidential information concerning a firm and clients to another
firm. In contrast with disclosures of information to third parties that are not
law firms, discussed above, disclosures to law firms raise the possibility that
the party to which the disclosure is made will use the information in competi-
tion with the firm. One response to the possibility of competitive use of the
information by the recipient firm is to ban disclosures of confidential firm
information to other firms altogether. Such a ban, however, could operate to
the detriment of clients. The hiring firm would be expected to accept the
lawyer with significant uncertainty concerning the identity of the lawyer's
clients,79 the nature of the lawyer's practice," and the level of firm support
and billings of the client, the express consent of the client should be obtained before any
information is provided to third parties. The same is true if the client has not expressly
instructed the lawyer to maintain the confidentiality of the information but it is reasonable to
assume that the client would object to the disclosure of the information.
79. Among the likely questions: To what extent will the clients the lawyer brings to the
firm give rise to conflicts with the firm's existing clients?
80. Among the likely questions: What are the billing arrangements standard in the prac-
tice? Is the practice cyclical? Will the practice integrate well within the firm and likely lead to
additional business?
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and resources necessary to support the practice."1 The uncertainties generated
by such a ban on the use and disclosure of information would retard the ability
of lawyers to change firms, even when a change of firms may facilitate the
provision of services on a cost-effective basis to clients.82 Allowing limited
disclosures of firm information under conditions unlikely to give another firm
a competitive advantage is preferable to banning disclosures altogether. The
key, of course, lies in identifying the conditions.
Evaluating the potential profitability of a partner's practice may prove
difficult without detailed information, both financial and nonfinancial, on the
firm itself. Of particular interest are data on the partner's revenues, billing
rates supporting the revenues, billing rates and hours billed by all attorneys and
paralegals working on client matters, and overhead expenses (including
compensation levels within the firm). Additional matters of interest may
include billing and collection practices, the identity of attorneys and staff
working on client matters, the cost and characteristics of support systems (for
example, data management programs) used for particular clients, and so forth.
In short, for the hiring firm to achieve a desired level of certainty in evaluating
the practice of a lawyer and the resources necessary to support the practice, it
may be necessary to evaluate a considerable amount of information, financial
and otherwise, concerning the firm of which the lawyer is presently a partner.
Although extensive information may be desired, only limited firm infor-
mation may be disclosed to another firm as part of a partner's discussions with
that firm concerning a possible affiliation. The information that may be dis-
closed is the minimum necessary to allow a general assessment of the nature
of the partner's practice, the resources required to support the practice,
potential conflicts with existing clients of the firm, and an appropriate range
of compensation.
By allowing only minimal information, a balance is struck between the
interests of the firm in maintaining the confidentiality of information, the
interests of clients in insuring that their representation will continue with the
lawyers of their choice and with a minimum of disruption, and the interests of
lawyers in career development.83 Greater information could reduce the risks
81. Among the likely questions: How many associates, paralegals, and other staff will
be required? How much office space, and where, will be needed? To what extent will the firm
be asked to advance costs for clients?
82. For a discussion of why clients may benefit from an environment in which lawyers
are able to move among firms, see Robert W. Hillman, The Law Firms as Jurassic Park Com-
ments on Howard v. Babcock, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 533, 547-50 (1994).
83. For some types of information, relatively simple steps (such as redacting information)
may be taken to avoid disclosures that are excessive. The ease of limiting such information is
an important factor in determining whether only information that is minimally necessary to
achieve the permitted objectives has been disclosed.
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associated with uncertainty for both the lawyer and the firm with which the
lawyer wished to affiliate, but such a gain would be at the cost of undermin-
ing, to an extent greater than is necessary, the confidentiality of firm informa-
tion.
D. Disclosure of Client-Specific Information
Client-specific information (that is, information that relates in
detail to a particular client and the services provided by the
firm to that client) may be disclosed by a partner to another
firm in connection with the partner's exploration of a possible
affiliation with that firm if each of the following conditions is
satisfied:
1. The information relates directly to a client of the firm and
the legal services provided by the firm to that client;
2. The information is available to the client, the client is under
no independent duty to the firm to maintain the confidential-
ity of the information, and the client would itself be free to
disclose it to another firm;
3. The partner reasonably believes the client is likely to follow
the lawyer to a new firm; and
4. The client consents to the disclosure (before orafterthe fact).
Information pertaining to specific clients - client-specific information -
should be distinguished from more generic information concerning a firm.
Client-specific information includes data particular to clients, such as client
identity, billings, billing rates, and identity of staff within the firm working on
client matters. Such information, of course, overlaps firm information. It
differs from other firm information, however, in that both the firm and the
client to which the information pertains may claim some right to control use
of the information. Indeed, client-specific information may be available
directly from the client, a fact that may lessen the firm's expectations that the
information will not be revealed to third parties."'
Because both the firm and the client may be seen as having proprietary
rights in client-specific information and potentially conflicting interests in
84. But cf Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921,939 (Cal. 1966) (en banc). The
court suggests in a case involving the fiduciary duties of a corporate officer that disclosure of
salaries may be improper even if information is available from the employees themselves:
It requires little talent to distinguish between a situation in which an individual
voluntarily discloses his own salary to another and one in which the unpublished
salary list of a group of prospective employees is revealed to a competitor for the
purpose of facilitating the recruitment of the corporation's personnel.
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controlling its use, the principle addressing client-specific information at-
tempts to balance the competing interests in the information. Prohibiting the
disclosure of client-specific information undoubtedly would sharply diminish
the mobility of lawyers. The promotion of firm stability, however, ig not a
sufficient reason in itself to restrict the use of client-specific information when
disclosure of the information is consistent with the interests of clients and
with their consent, if not direction."
As discussed above, a lawyer may be under constraints concerning what
can be discussed with a client before the firm is advised of the lawyer's intent
to withdraw. 6 For this reason, the principle focuses on a lawyer's reasonable
assumption that a particular client on whom information is released would
choose to follow the lawyer to a new firm. For the same reason, client con-
sent, although necessary to support the disclosures, may be secured after the
firm is informed by the lawyer of the withdrawal plans and the lawyer is free
to solicit the client.
IV. Client Files
A. In General
Upon authorization by the client, a lawyer withdrawing from a
firm may take files of the client reasonably related to represen-
tation of the client.
B. Notice and Opportunity to Make Copies
Client files should not be taken from the firm by a departing
lawyer without prior notice to the firm, which should be af-
forded an opportunity to copy, at its expense, the contents of
any files to be removed.
C. Client Authorization
Absent client authorization, a withdrawing lawyer should not
remove client files from the firm without the consent of the firm.
From the precept that clients have a near-absolute right to choose their
lawyers flows the right of a client to discharge a law firm at any time, with or
without cause." The right to discharge a firm and substitute new counsel (for
85. On occasion, a client dissatisfied with the quality of legal services received may take
the lead in suggesting that a lawyer change firms.
86. See supra Part II.A.
87. See, e.g., MODELRULES, supranote 57, Rule 1. 16(a)(3) (discussing mandatory lawyer
withdrawal upon discharge by client); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 43
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992) (stating that lawyer's authority to represent client ends when
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example, a former partner of the discharged firm) could easily be frustrated
by the discharged firm's refusal to release the files of the client. For this
reason, a requirement that the files follow the direction of the client is an
essential part of the client's right to choose counsel.8"
To be sure, disputes over the custody of files present a clear conflict
between property rights of law firms and their clients. That a firm has some
"proprietary" interest in client files is undeniable, at least to the extent that the
files include the work product of attorneys. Subject to exceptions discussed
below, however, the firm's claim to the content of the files is not superior to
the claim of the clients themselves. In rejecting the right of a discharged firm
to withhold significant portions of a file absent a showing by the client that
the information is needed, the New York Court of Appeals recently observed:
[A]n attorney's fiduciary relationship with a client may continue even after
representation has concluded. Among the duties of an attorney as fiduciary
and agent of the client are those of openness and conscientious disclo-
sure .... That obligation of forthrightness of an attorney toward a client
is not furthered by the attorney's ability to cull from the client's file docu-
ments generated through fully compensated representation, which the
attorney unilaterally decides the client has no right to see. 9
In concluding that a client should be entitled to inspect and copy "work
product materials, for the creation of which they paid during the course of the
firm's representation," 90 the court relied in part on the draft of the Restatement
client discharges lawyer); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs § 9.5.2, at 545
(1986) ("It is now uniformly recognized that the client-lawyer contract is terminable at will by
the client. For good reasons, poor reasons, or the worst of reasons, a client may fire the
lawyer."). On compensation for the discharged firm, see generally LAWYER MOBILITY, supra
note 1, § 2.3.1.
88. See, e.g., Rose v. State Bar, 779 P.2d 761, 765 (Cal. 1989) ("But there can be no
doubt that the balance of an attorney's litigation file is the property of the client and must be
surrendered promptly upon request to the client or the client's new counsel once the representa-
tion has terminated.").
89. Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, 689 N.E.2d 879, 882-83
(N.Y. 1997). In concluding that a client should be afforded presumptive access to the entire
file, subjectto narrow exceptions, the court of appeals rejected the lower court's conclusion that
requested portions of the file constituted "private property" and that the client had failed to show
why it needed the material. See Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, 653
N.Y.S.2d 12 (App. Div.), rev'd, 689 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1997).
90. Sage Realty, 689 N.E.2d at 883. It is perhaps misleading to describe the materials
requested as "a file." See Dean Starkman, New York Dispute Raises Issue of Clients'Right to
Lawyers'Files, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1998, at BI 8 col. 1.
Proskauer is now turning over all of the 175,000 or so disputed pages- and making
copies for itself in preparation of its malpractice defense. The Kaufmans' new
lawyers have just begun to pore over the records, and Mr. Kaufman says he still
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of the Law Governing Lawyers, which generally requires delivery of "docu-
ments" on the demand of the client or upon the termination of representation.9'
A contrary position would introduce a significant limitation on a client's
ability to change firms, a change for which there seems to be little present
support.92
A limited accommodation of conflicting rights to files may be accom-
plished by allowing the firm to retain copies of the transferred files.93 A firm
isn't sure why the law firm fought so hard to keep them. "There must be something
in there they don't want us to see," he says.
Id.
91. See RESTATEMENTOFTHELAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS § 58(3) (Proposed Final Draft,
Mar. 29, 1996).
Unless a client or former client consents to nondelivery or substantial grounds exist
for refusing to make delivery, a lawyer must deliver to the client or former client,
at an appropriate time and in any event promptly after the representation ends, such
originals and copies of other documents possessed by the lawyer relating to the
representation as the client or former client reasonably needs.
Id. But cf Neeb v. Superior Court, 262 Cal. Rptr. 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1989) (adhering to
minority view suggesting that portion of file constituting attorney "work product" may be
property of firm or attorney rather than client), review granted and opinion superseded, 788
P.2d 1154 (Cal.), review dismissed, 795 P.2d 782 (Cal. 1990). A related issue, not addressed
in this Article, concerns the relative rights of the firm and its lawyers (independent of the rights
of clients) to work product in client files.
92. Cf Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150,158-59 (Cal. 1993) (suggesting limitations that
presently exist on client's choice ofcounsel, including conflict ofinterest restraints on represen-
tation).
The Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar Association recently issued
an ethics opinion that is notably unhelpful in providing guidance on this issue. See D.C. Bar
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 273 (1997). After commenting that retaining liens may be asserted
only in the narrowest of circumstances and that a firm may retain copies of files it surrenders
to former clients, the opinion observed:
Other questions of ownership vis a vis a client, and questions of ownership of files
and other written materials as between departing lawyers and their former law
firms, are not governed primarily by the Rules of Professional Conduct. Some
ownership and control questions may be resolved by reference to statutory and
common law rules of personal property. And, where the departing lawyer is a
partner, partnership law principles would be relevant. Our Committee does not
opine on such questions of law. Nevertheless, a lawyer should think carefully about
whether the lawyer may take such materials with him/her, because a lawyer's
removal or copying, without the firm's consent, of materials from a law firm that
do not belong to the lawyer, that are the property of the law firm, and that are
intended to be used by the lawyer in his new affiliation, could constitute dishonesty,
which is professional misconduct under Rule 8.4(c).
Id. at 192.
93. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 168 (1986) (stating that firm may copy
released files, at its expense).
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may wish to retain copies for many reasons, not the least of which is the
usefulness of the information in defending a later malpractice action by the
former client. To allow such copying, and to allow the firm an opportunity to
record which files are taken, the withdrawing attorney should notify the firm
before taking files.
D. Retaining Liens
The firm's obligation to release client files to a withdrawing
lawyer pursuant to directions from the client is subject to the
firm's limited right (recognized in some jurisdictions) to assert
a retaining lien to secure payment of fees and sums advanced to
the client by the firm.
A retaining lien is a possessory lien recognized by some, but not all,
jurisdictions.9" It attaches to all papers, books, documents, securities, moneys,
and property of the client in the possession of the firm.95 Because it is a
possessory lien, the right to assert a retaining lien is lost upon the voluntary
surrender of files.
96
The retaining lien, which is a creature of both statutory and common law,
is not recognized in all jurisdictions.97 Even where recognized, retaining liens
invite litigation.98 Some courts and ethics opinions have concluded that files
may not be retained under conditions likely to cause prejudice to clients.99
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 464(b) (1958).
95. See id.
96. On retaining liens generally, see LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 1, § 2.3.2.
97. The draft Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers does not recognize retaining
liens (except to the extent authorized by statute or rule). It does, however, allow a lawyer to
withhold delivery of a document prepared by the lawyer if the client has not paid the fees
associated with the preparation, provided nondelivery would not unreasonably harm the client.
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNNG LAWYERS § 55(1) (Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 29,
1996). The much older Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 464(b) (1958), and Restatement of
Security § 62(b) (1941), do recognize retaining liens. The Model Rules reflect drafting dexter-
ity: Rule 1.16(d) allows a terminated lawyer to "retain papers relating to the client to the extent
permitted by other law." MODEL RULES, supra note 57, Rule 1.16(d). Rule 1.80)(1) allows a
lawyer to "acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses." Id. Rule
1.80)(1). One ethics opinion assumed, incorrectly, that these provisions are authority for
retaining liens but warned: "The availability in the District of Columbia of retaining lien against
client files is substantially narrower than under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct."
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 273 (1997).
98. Ethics opinions issued by bar associations seem particularly hostile to retaining liens.
For a list and discussion of such opinions, see LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 1, § 2.3.2.2.
99. See, e.g.,Pomerantzv. Schandler, 704 F.2d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 1983) (involving papers
needed to defend criminal prosecution); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 273 (1997) ("A
retaining lien may be asserted against client files only in the narrowest of circumstances ...
where the client is able to pay and where the assertion of the lien will not risk irreparable harm
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Moreover, a few courts have ruled files must be surrendered when adequate
security for fees and expenses is offered,"°' a result entirely sensible given that
the retaining lien exists solely for the purpose of securing such sums.
On the whole, case law and ethics opinions display an increasing hostility
towards retaining liens. The hostility is well captured by commentary in the
draft Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers:
While a broad retaining lien might protect the lawyer's legitimate interest
in receiving compensation, drawbacks outweigh that advantage. The
lawyer obtains payment by keeping from the client papers and property that
the client entrusted to the lawyer in order to gain help. The use of the
client's papers against the client is in tension with the fiduciary responsibil-
ities of lawyers .... [T]he very point of a retaining lien, if accepted at all,
is to coerce payment by withholding papers the client needs.'0 '
Although the retaining lien has been recognized for centuries, 2 its days as a
means of extracting payment from clients may be numbered.
V. Recruitment of Staff
A. Recruitment Prior to Notice of Withdrawal
A partner planning to withdraw from a firm may not recruit
(that is, persuade to leave) staff of the firm prior to giving the
partnership notice of withdrawal.
B. Recruitment After Notice of Withdrawal but Prior to Withdrawal
Prior to withdrawal from the firm but after notice of with-
drawal has been given, a partner withdrawing from a firm may
not recruit staff of the firm except to the extent reasonably
necessary to provide services to clients likely to remain with the
lawyer, and then only if the firm is notified in advance of the
identity of individuals to be recruited.
C. Recruitment After Withdrawal
Following withdrawal from a firm, a former partner of the firm
is free to recruit staff of the firm.
to the client." (footnote omitted)).
100. See, e.g., Smith v. Patton, 562 So. 2d 859,860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (explaining
that attorney may retain file "until such time as the fee dispute is resolved, or security posted
for payment of that fee").
101. RESTATEmENT OFTHELAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 55 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft,
Mar. 29, 1996).
102. The retaining lien dates at least to 1734. See Exparte Bush, 22 Eng. Rep. 93 (Ch.
1734).
1029
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 997 (1998)
In providing services to a client, a lawyer is often supported by a "team"
that may include (in addition to other partners) associates, paralegals, and a
variety of other staff assistants. Commonly, some or all of the supporting staff
move with an attorney who departs from a firm. This raises questions con-
cerning the extent to which a partner's duties to the partnership may restrict
the partner's attempts to recruit staff ofthe firm experienced in handling client
affairs.
The Restatement (Second) ofAgency offers the following general guid-
ance when addressing the propriety of soliciting employees in anticipation of
competition with the principal:
The limits of proper conduct with reference to securing the services of
fellow employees are not well marked. An employee is subject to liability
if, before or after leaving employment, he causes fellow employees to
break their contracts with the employer. On the other hand, it is normally
permissible for employees of a firm, or some of its partners, to agree
among themselves, while still employed, that they will engage in competi-
tion with the firm at the end of the period specified in their employment
contracts. However, a court may find that it is a breach of duty for a
number of the key officers or employees to agree to leave their employment
simultaneously and without giving the employer an opportunity to hire and
train replacements." 3
The comment is generic in that it is directed to the duties of an agent in
general and does not address how the duties should be defined in the setting
of a firm providing professional services to clients.
There is relatively little reported litigation concerning the recruitment of
law firm staff. The New Jersey Supreme Court decision Jacob v. Norris,
McLaughlin & Marcus"°4 is a notable exception. In Jacob, a law firm's part-
nership agreement imposed economic penalties on any withdrawing partner
who "solicits other professional and /or paraprofessional employees of the
Law Firm to engage in the practice of law with the departed Member.""1 5 In
striking down the contractual restraint on the raiding of staff, the court empha-
sized the interests of both lawyers and nonlawyers in career mobility. 6
Particularly interesting was the court's conclusion concerning paraprofes-
sionals: "It is important that non-lawyer employees have as much mobility in
employment opportunity as possible consistent with the protection of clients'
interests. [A]ny restrictions on the nonlawyer's employment should be held
to the minimum necessary to protect confidentiality of client information."
07
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 cmt. e (1958).
104. 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
105. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 145 (N.J. 1992).
106. See id. at 153.
107. Id. (citation omitted). As to associates, the court reasoned that the agreement "unduly
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Jacob addressed the enforcement of an anti-raiding contract rather than
the extent to which recruitment of staff is consistent with a partner's status as
a fiduciary. The case does serve as a useful reminder, however, that externali-
ties may be associated with the application of fiduciary standards to restrain
solicitation of staff.
Some parallels may be drawn between the solicitation of clients, dis-
cussed above," and the recruitment of staff. On the one hand, both activities
raise difficult questions concerning the loyalty obligations running from the
lawyer to the partnership. On the other hand, both solicitation of clients and
recruitment of staff may seem essential to the smooth transition of a lawyer
from one firm to another. There are distinctions, however, between the two
activities that may justify imposition of tighter restrictions on the solicitation
of staff than on the solicitation of clients. As discussed above, the right of a
client to the lawyer or firm of her choice is an important right protected by
norms of legal ethics and by substantial case law. Further, the fiduciary duties
that run between partners are defined, and even limited, by the fiduciary duties
that run between lawyer, or law firm, and client.
The relationship between lawyer and client has strong fiduciary over-
tones. Clients often view their relationships with particular lawyers as tran-
scending the lawyers' firm affiliations. In contrast, a lawyer does not stand
in a fiduciary relationship to employees of the firm. This is true even if the
employees have worked closely with the lawyer over extended periods of
time. It is true that feelings of loyalty may extend on a reciprocal basis
between a lawyer and employees of the firm, but the relationship is not of a
type that would limit the fiduciary duty owed by the lawyer to partners in the
firm. For these reasons, recruitment of firm employees is permissible on a
more limited basis than is solicitation of clients.
Generally, recruitment of firm employees should not occur until after the
lawyer has left the firm. If applied inflexibly, however, a pre-withdrawal ban
on recruitment of firm employees may impair the ongoing representation of
clients by disrupting, at least temporarily, staffing to provide services to
clients. Once again, the overriding value of protecting the interests of clients
serves to temper fiduciary duties that run between law partners. Here, the
conflicting duties to clients and law partners may be accommodated by
allowing pre-withdrawal recruitment of employees to the extent reasonably
necessary to avoid disruption in the representation of clients. This is allowed
only after the firm has been given notice of the lawyer's intention to with-
draw. No justification exists for surreptitious recruitment. The firm should
constricts the right to practice of those attorneys who would have liked to have accompanied
a departing partner, but who were not informed of that partner's interest due to an agreement
creating a disincentive against their being contacted." Id.
108. See supra Part lI.
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be told the identity of employees to be so solicited so that it has a reasonable
opportunity to persuade the employees to remain with the firm.
A partner's fiduciary duty of loyalty generally ends at the point of with-
drawal from the partnership, at least insofar as competition with the partner-
ship is concerned. Accordingly, restraints on the recruitment of employees of
the firm no longer apply.0 9 The generality of this statement, however, is
somewhat misleading. The use of information taken from the firm to advance
the recruitment of firm employees may constitute an improper taking of
information from the firm.' In addition, some of the targets of recruitment
are themselves restricted by obligations imposed on fiduciaries, inducement
of a breach of those duties or other duties arising under contract may be




Following the withdrawal of a partner, the firm and its former
partner have a duty to account to each other for income derived
from cases pending at the time of withdrawal.
B. Overhead Expenses
In accounting for post-withdrawal income, the firm and its
former partner may make allowance for reasonable overhead
expenses chargeable to the production of the income.
That income is shared from the completion of unfinished business exist-
ing at the time of withdrawal is a straightforward application of partnership
law principles that have been in effect for decades. Under the UPA, the with-
drawal of a partner causes a dissolution of the partnership,"' which continues
in existence for the purpose of winding up business pending on the date of
dissolution."' RUPA complicates the matter somewhat by allowing partner-
109. See, e.g., RUPA (1994) § 603(b)(2) (statingthatdissociationterminatespartner's duty
of loyalty); ef RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(a) (1957) (stating that duty not to
compete with principal ends with termination of agency).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF AGENcY § 396(b) (stating that after termination of
agency, agent has duty "not to use.., in competition with the principal or to his injury, trade
secrets, written lists of names, or other similar confidential matters given to him only for the
principal's use" and that "agent is entitled to use general information ... retained in his
memory, if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent").
111. See, e.g., Bancroft-Whitney v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 926 (Cal. 1966) (en banc).
112. See supra Part II.C.
113. See UPA (1914) §§ 29, 31.
114. See id. § 30.
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ships formed for a term to survive the withdrawal of a partner without dissolu-
tion."' Most law partnerships, however, are at-will rather than term partner-
ships," 6 which means that, even under RUPA, dissolution of the law partner-
ship remains the normal consequence of the withdrawal of a partner."7
Dissolution's principal impact is in the accounting for income."' Under
both the UPA and RUPA, income generated from the winding up of a dis-
solved partnership is partnership income, to be shared among all partners
(including the partner whose withdrawal caused a dissolution of the partner-
ship)."9 Apart from partner compensation, discussed below, most modem
opinions allow adjustment to income attributable to winding up to reflect
overhead expenses associated with producing the income. 2
Although RUPA continues the basic dissolution model of the UPA for
at-will partnerships, one little-noticed change of RUPA may substantially
affectthe division ofpost-withdrawal income. UndertheUPA's "no compen-
sation rule," no partner is entitled to special compensation for completing
115. See RUPA (1994) §§ 801(1), 801(2) (distinguishing between partnership at will and
partnership for definite term or particular undertaking). A primary goal ofRUPA wasto modify
the UPA's dissolution provisions to accord partnerships an entity status that would allow them
to survive, without dissolution, the withdrawals of their members. See generally Donald J.
Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW.
427, 435-36 (1991).
116. On the "at will" nature of most law partnerships, see LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note
1, § 4.3.4. The consequences under RUPA of establishing a term or undertaking for a law firm
are not addressed in this Article.
117. RUPA does include an option to revoke the dissolution of a partnership that is
winding up if all partners, including the partner who has withdrawn, so consents. See RUPA
§ 802(b). Presumably, the necessary consent will be grounded on an agreement concerning the
division of income among partners.
118. The idea that a partnership dissolves by operation of law with the withdrawal of a
single partner may seem at odds with perceptions of stability commonly associated with larger
law firms consisting of hundreds of partners. The conflict, however, is a false one. To say that
a partnership dissolves is not to suggest that the firm through which it operates suffers the
slightest amount of instability. When a partner leaves, the partnership is simply replaced by a
successor partnership consisting of the original partners but excluding the partner who has
withdrawn. For a time, the original partnership exists side by side with the successor partner-
ship. The operative distinction between the two partnerships essentially is one of accounting
for income. For a given firm, the partnership may dissolve and reform tens or even hundreds
of times without any apparent effects or disruption on the continuity of the firm.
119. See generally LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 1, §§ 4.6-4.7.
120. See Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19-20 (Ct. App. 1984); Beckman v. Farmer,
579 A.2d 618, 640 (D.C. 1990); see also Flynn v. Cohn, 607 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ill. 1992)
(relying on expert testimony and using overhead of firm prior to dissolution as means of calcu-
lating postdissolution expenses). But see, e.g., Hawkesworth v. Ponzoli, 388 So. 2d 299, 301
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (applying no-compensation rule to deny reimbursement of overhead
expenses).
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cases pending at the time of dissolution."' In theory, compensation is not
required because burdens will be proportionate as each partner continues to
work to bring matters to completion." As a predictor of behavior, the theory
seems questionable.' In reality, the effect of the no-compensation rule is to
favor those attorneys whose clients generated a steady flow of new matters at
the expense of attorneys whose clients generate sizable matters that extend
over lengthy periods of time.' 24
The no-compensation rule has been subject to much criticism"2 and does
not survive in RUPA, which expressly creates an entitlement to "reasonable
compensation for services rendered in winding up the business of the partner-
ship."'2 6 RUPA actually may promote law firm instability by providing an
incentive to take active cases from a law firm.2 7 Under RUPA, the spoils will
go to the victor who controls the client.
C. Effect of Agreement
The division of post-withdrawal income is subject to agreement
among the partners, provided that the agreement does not
operate to prevent clients from choosing their counsel.
The requirement that income must be shared from the completion of
matters pending at the time of a partner's withdrawal is a default provision of
121. A limited exception, applicable in the case of a death of a partner, allows reasonable
compensation for a surviving partner who winds up partnership affairs. See UPA (1914) § 18(f).
122. See, e.g., Fox v. Abrams, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260,265 (1985) ("On balance, the allocation
of fees according to each partner's interest in the former partnership should not work an undue
hardship as to any partner where each partner completes work on the partnership's cases which
are active upon dissolution.").
123. See, e.g., Comment, Dissolution of a Law Partnership - Goodwill, Winding Up
Profits, & Additional Compensation, 6 J. LEGAL PROF. 277, 290 (1981) ("Surely, the effect of
the no additional compensation rule is a decrease in the quality and amount of time expended
by attorneys for left over clients since they are certainly better compensated for their efforts on
behalf of their new clientele.").
124. This point is developed more fully in LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 1, § 4.6.4.
125. See generally LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 1, § 4.6.1; Comment, Winding Up
Dissolved Law Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CAL.L.REV.
1597 (1985).
126. RUPA (1994) § 401(h).
127. Cf. Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (Ct. App. 1984).
The [no compensation] rule prevents partners from competing for the most remu-
nerative cases during the life of the partnership in anticipation that they might retain
those cases should the partnership dissolve. It also discourages former partners
from scrambling to take physical possession of files and seeking personal gain by
soliciting a firm's existing clients upon dissolution.
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the partnership statutes. This means that partners are free to reach agreements
concerning how post-withdrawal income will be shared. Such understandings
are commonly included in partnership agreements.
Agreements concerning the division of post-withdrawal income should
be given effect unless they serve to undermine the right of clients to choose
their lawyers. 2 ' Of particular concern are one-sided fee sharing agreements
that require a former partner to share fees with the firm on cases taken from
the firm but relieve the firm of any obligation to share its fees with the former
partner on matters pending at the time of withdrawal. Although such an
agreement may make it financially difficult or even impossible for a with-
drawing partner to represent clients of the firm, some reported decisions
support one-sided fee sharing agreements without regard to their potentially
negative effects on clients. 9 Most courts, however, consider significant
financial disincentives to competition as the operative equivalent of covenants




This Article offers a set of principles that may operate as a framework for
defining the duties of partners withdrawing from a law firm. It addresses the
many questions left unanswered by the multiplicity of statutes purporting to
modernize the law of business associations. Law reform keyed to developing
new forms of business associations has expanded associational choices for
participants in business and professional ventures. The proliferation of
statutes, however, has extended the margins of law at the expense of ignoring
the core. Basic questions concerning loyalty and candor obligations as well
as the extent to which competition with present or former partners is allowed
are inadequately addressed by the new legislation.
128. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 159 n.8 (Cal. 1993) (stating that
agreement effectively providing compensation to former partners at rate of $5.10 per hour for
15,917 billable hours on cases they took from firm may be enforceable). But cf Kelly v. Smith,
611 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind. 1993) (interpreting contract in way that avoided "inequitable" result
of one-sided fee sharing). For a discussion of one-sided fee sharing, see LAWYER MOBILITY,
supra note 1, § 2.3.4.4.
130. See Jacob. v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 148 (N.J. 1992); Cohen
v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,411-12 (N.Y. 1989); cf Pettingell v. Morrison, Mahoney
& Miller, 687 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Mass. 1997) (stating that forfeiture for competition clauses
are generally unenforceable except under limited circumstances, such as when "departing
partner leaves the firm with onerous partnership debts, threatening the financial integrity of the
firm").
131. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1997); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (1980).
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To take but one example, consider the priorities suggested by RUPA, the
first major overhaul of partnership law in more than seven decades. The
uniform act devotes greater attention and space to such new issues as conver-
sion of partnerships into limited partnerships,'32 conversion of limited partner-
ships into partnerships,'33 partnership mergers, 3 4 and the execution, filing and
recording of statements'35 than it does to a statement of the "General Stan-
dards of Partner's Conduct."'36 Along the same line, an entire article of
RUPA claims to address the "Nature of Partnership." '137 This intriguing title
is at best misleading for surely the drafters of RUPA did not mean to suggest
that the nature of the partnership may be defined in four short provisions that
simply describe a partnership as an entity distinct from its members, 3 ' state
how a partnership is formed,'39 define property acquired by the partnership as
partnership property, 40 and declare when property is partnership property.' 4'
Extending limited liability, expanding constructive notice through the
expansion of public filings, developing complicated control structures to
affect tax treatment of income, and creating a new associational vehicle that
allows professionals to incorporate their practices for the purpose of gaining
tax advantages are among the driving forces behind statutory reform in the
second half of the twentieth century and may very well be appropriate aims
of law reform. Further reform efforts, however, should more carefully define
and refine the law governing the relationships that exist among individuals
associated in business and professional activities. In this regard, the American
Law Institute's project to develop the Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Agency, which is still in its early stage, offers much promise.
132. See RUPA (1994) § 902.
133. See id. § 903.
134. See id. §§ 906, 907.
135. See id. § 105.
136. See id. § 404.
137. See id. art. 2.
138. See id. § 201.
139. See id. § 202.
140. See id. § 203.




General Principles on the Duties of Partners Withdrawing from Law Firms
L Planning for Withdrawal
A. Contemplation of Withdrawal. A partner generally has no duty to dis-
close to other partners in a firm that the partner is considering withdrawal
from the firm.
B. Disclosure of Intent to Withdraw
1. Notice of Withdrawal. A partner should provide reasonable notice
of intent to withdraw from a firm. Relevant factors in evaluating the
reasonableness of notice include:
(a) Past practices concerning withdrawals from the firm;
(b) Compliance with notice provisions of a partnership agreement;
(c) The possibility of retribution from the firm that may directly or
indirectly harm clients; and
(d) The promptness with which a partner discloses an intent to
withdraw after that intent has been formed.
2. Disclosure of the Possibility of Withdrawal. A partner seriously con-
sidering withdrawal should so advise other partners if they are about
to make a material decision or commitment of resources in reliance
on the partner's continued membership in the firm.
3. Responding Truthfully to Inquiries. A partner should respond truth-
fully to good faith inquiries made by other partners concerning the
partner's plans for withdrawal.
C. Making Logistical Arrangements in Anticipation of Withdrawal. A
partner may make plans to leave a firm prior to announcing the with-
drawal to the other partners. Such plans may include logistical pre-
departure arrangements such as arranging bank financing or locating
alternative space and affiliations.
II. Notification and Solicitation of Clients
A. Notification and Solicitation of Clients Prior to Announcement ofDepar-
ture. A partner planning to withdraw from a firm should not solicit
clients (that is, attempt to secure their commitments to retain the lawyer
or a new firm) before informing the firm of the partner's intent to with-
draw.
B. Notification and Solicitation of Clients After Announcement of Plans to
Withdraw
1. Following a partner's announcement of plans to withdraw from a
firm, the partner may solicit clients of the firm with whom the partner
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has a professional relationship if each of the following conditions is
satisfied:
(a) Sufficient time has elapsed following the announcement to
allow the firm an equal opportunity to compete for clients;
(b) The solicitation is not done in secret; and
(c) The client is advised or otherwise aware that it is free to choose
the current firm or the partner's new firm (or any other lawyer
or firm).
2. Both the firm and the withdrawing partner have a duty to ensure that
clients for whom the withdrawing partner is providing representation
are informed of the withdrawal and have an opportunity to make an
informed choice of counsel.
3. When possible and appropriate, a law firm and withdrawing partner
should cooperate to the end of providing joint notice of the with-
drawal to clients.
C. Causation of Loss as an Element of the Claim for Improper Solicitation
1. To be actionable as a breach of fiduciary duty, improper solicitation
activities must cause harm to the firm. If clients would have re-
mained with the departing lawyer in spite of any improper solicitation
activities, an actionable claim does not exist.
2. The 'burden of proving that each client decision in this regard was
unaffected by improper solicitation activities is on the departing
lawyer.
III Disclosures of Firm/Client Information to Third Parties
A. In General. Nonpublic firm-specific information pertaining to the fi-
nances, practice, and operations of a firm may not be disclosed by a
partner to third parties in competition with orto the injury of the partner's
present firm.
B. Disclosures to Parties Other than Law Firms
1. A partner may make limited disclosures of nonpublic information
concerning the firm and its clients to third parties, other than law
firms, for the purpose of facilitating contractual relationships neces-
sary to support the partner's post-withdrawal practice.
2. Such information must directly relate to the lawyer's practice and be
of the type customarily provided in similar transactions.
3. Reasonable steps should be taken to insure that the third parties
maintain the confidentiality of the information.
C. Disclosures to Law Firms. Limited items of confidential firm informa-
tion and client-specific information may be disclosed by a partner to
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another firm in connection with that partner's exploration of possible
affiliation with the firm.
1. The information that may be disclosed to another firm is the minimum
necessary to allow the parties to assess, with generality rather than
specificity:
(a) The general nature of the partner's practice;
(b) The firm's interest is accommodating that practice;
(c) The financial and personnel resources that would be needed to
support the practice;
(d) Any limitations that may exist (for example, conflict of interest
and imputed disqualification rules) that may limit the firm's
ability to represent clients of the partner; and
(e) An appropriate range of compensation.
2. Reasonable care should be taken to insure that the firm to which the
information is disclosed maintains the confidentiality of the informa-
tion.
D. Disclosure of Client-Specific Information. Client-specific information
(that is, information that relates in detail to a particular client and the
services provided by the firm to that client) may be disclosed by a partner
to another firm in connection with the partner's exploration of possible
affiliation with that firm if each of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. The information relates directly to a client of the firm and the legal
services provided by the firm to that client;
2. The information is available to the client, the client is under no
independent duty to the firm to maintain the confidentiality of the
information, and the client would itself be free to disclose it to an-
other firm;
3. The partner reasonably believes the client is likely to follow the
lawyer to a new firm; and
4. The client consents to the disclosure (before or after the fact).
IV Client Files
A. In General. Upon authorization by the client, a lawyer withdrawing from
a firm may take files of the client reasonably related to representation of
the client.
B. Notice and Opportunity to Make Copies. Client files should not be taken
from the firm by a departing lawyer without prior notice to the firm,
which should be afforded an opportunity to copy, at its expense, the
contents of any files to be removed.
C. ClientAuthorization. Absent client authorization, a withdrawing lawyer
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should not remove client files from the firm without the consent of the
firm.
D. Retaining Liens. The firm's obligation to release client files to a with-
drawing lawyer pursuant to directions from the client is subject to the
firm's limited right (recognized in somejurisdictions) to assert a retaining
lien to secure payment of fees and sums advanced to the client by the
firm.
V Recruitment of Staff
A. Recruitment Prior to Notice of Withdrawal. A partner planning to with-
draw from a firm may not recruit (that is, persuade to leave) staff of the
firm prior to giving the partnership notice of withdrawal.
B. Recruitment After Notice of Withdrawal but Prior to Withdrawal. Prior
to withdrawal from the firm but after notice of withdrawal has been
given, a partner withdrawing from a firm may not recruit staff of the firm
except to the extent reasonably necessary to provide services to clients
likely to remain with the lawyer, and then only if the firm is notified in
advance of the identity of individuals to be recruited.
C. Recruitment After Withdrawal. Following withdrawal from a firm, a
former partner of the firm is free to recruit staff of the firm.
VI. Post-Withdrawal Income
A. In General. Following the withdrawal of a partner, the firm and its
former partner have a duty to account to each other for income derived
from cases pending at the time of withdrawal.
B. Overhead Expenses. In accounting for post-withdrawal income, the firm
and its former partner may make allowance for reasonable overhead
expenses chargeable to the production of the income.
C. Effect ofAgreement. The division of post-withdrawal income is subject
to agreement among the partners, provided that the agreement does not
operate to prevent clients from choosing their counsel.
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